No prelo

  1. Delgado, L., & Picazo, C. (forthcoming). Exploiting Ambiguity. Mind.
  2. Pereira, R. H. (forthcoming). A demonstrative account of perceptual experience. Grazer Philosophische Studien.
  3. Pereira, R. H. (forthcoming). Kant's cognitive turn: Transcendental apperception as access consciousness. Disputatio.
  4. Venturi, G. (forthcoming). Mathematical Explanation. Synthese.

2026

  1. Costa, M. W. A. da. (2026). Arquivos mentais: uma introdução. Polifonia em foco, 4, 1–27.
  2. Delgado, L., & Camargo, C. (2026). Blocking meaning creation: Impostor concepts and hermeneutical injustice. Synthese, 207:38.
  3. Ferrari, F. M. (2026). On the formal compatibility between ontic emergence and physicalism. Theoria, 92(2): e7006.
  4. Jockwich, S., Tarafder, S., & Venturi, G. (2026). A note on the axiom of choice in an iterative paraconsistent set theory. Logic Journal of the IGPL, 34(3): jzag031.
  5. Lampert, F. (2026). Rigidity and factivity. Episteme, 23(2), 439–444.
  6. Lampert, F., & Waldrop, J. (2026). Free will and intensional operators. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 55(2), 190–208.
  7. Markosian, N. (2026). What is time? Analysis: anag006.
  8. Marsili, N. (2026). Lying and insincerity. In H. Nesi & P. Milin (Eds.), International encyclopedia of language and linguistics. Elsevier.
  9. Marsili, N. (2026). Sincerity and insincerity. Cambridge University Press.
  10. Miranda e Silva, J. V., Rodrigues, C., & Vital Brazil, E. (2026). On the interface between linguistics, computer science and psychiatry: Analyzing textual key-factors affecting BERT-based classification of schizophrenia in social media texts. Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence, 9: 1781552.
  11. Morokawa, R. L. (2026). O debate Beardsley-Dickie sobre a natureza da experiência estética. Perspectiva Filosófica (UFPE), 52, 91–112.
  12. Pereira, R. H. (2026). For-me-ness: A critical assessment of the phenomenal mineness thesis. Cognitive Processing. Advance online publication.
  13. Pereira, R. H. (2026). Predictive processing in Kant's cognitive architecture. Contemporary Studies in Kantian Philosophy, 10, 93–115.
  14. Teixeira, C. (2026). Experience and the a priori. In D. Dodd & E. Zardini (Eds.), The a priori (pp. 311–337). Oxford University Press.
  15. Teixeira Yago, P., & Venturi, G. (2026). Logics of unknowable (necessary) truths. Studia Logica, 1–26.
  16. Venturi, G. (2026). Generic sets and arbitrary objects. Noûs: e70039.
  17. Xavier, P., & Silva, M. (2026). Deep disagreements: On the normative Agrippan trilemma, grammatical sovereignty, and hinge certainties as metacriteria for action. Griot, 26(2), 1–21.

2025

  1. Antos, C., Barton, N., & Venturi, G. (2025a). Introduction. In C. Antos, N. Barton, & G. Venturi (Eds.), The Palgrave companion to the philosophy of set theory (pp. 1–8). Springer.
  2. Antos, C., Barton, N., & Venturi, G. (2025b). The Palgrave companion to the philosophy of set theory. Springer.
  3. Barton, N., & Venturi, G. (2025). Language, models, and reality: Weak existence and a threefold correspondence. In C. Antos, N. Barton, & G. Venturi (Eds.), The Palgrave companion to the philosophy of set theory (pp. 359–387). Springer.
  4. Costa, M. W. A. d. (2025). Filosofia da lógica (2. ed.). Intersaberes.
  5. Crone, K. (2025a). Collective intentionality: Why content matters. Inquiry, 1–23.
  6. Crone, K. (2025b). The annual birthday party: Remembering recurring events from one's past. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 16(4), 1273–1287.
  7. Crone, K., & Gab, M. (2025). Are groups agents? A critique of interpretivism. Cogent Arts & Humanities, 12(1): 2566968.
  8. Crone, K., Gab, M., & Vincini, S. (2025). Foundations of joint action: What are minimal forms of shared intentionality? Philosophical Psychology, 38(5), 1897–1908.
  9. Kneer, M., & Marsili, N. (2025). The truth about assertion and retraction: A review of the empirical literature. In A. Wiegmann (Ed.), Lying, fake news, and bullshit (pp. 81–116). Bloomsbury.
  10. Lampert, F. (2025). Freedom, omniscience and the contingent a priori. Mind, 134(533), 1–32.
  11. McCarroll, C. J., & Perrin, D. (2025). Between truth and authenticity in episodic memory: The case for veridicalism. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 4(2): 24.
  12. Morokawa, R. L., & Salles, S. (Orgs.). (2025). Textos selecionados sobre Normatividade (Série Investigação Filosófica). NEPFIL Online.
  13. Openshaw, J., Michaelian, K., & Perrin, D. (2025). Reference and remembering: Editorial introduction. Synthese, 205(3): 42.
  14. Pagin, P., & Marsili, N. (2025). Assertion. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Ed. Outono 2025). Stanford University. https://stanford.edu
  15. Pereira, R. H. S. (2025a). Particularism defended. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 4: 325.
  16. Pereira, R. H. S. (2025b). The Kantian version of Russellian neutral monism. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 102, 1–18.
  17. Pereira, R. H. S., & Barcellos, V. M. (2025a). Review of Egan F. Deflating mental representation. Manuscrito, 48(4), 1–10.
  18. Pereira, R. H. S., & Barcellos, V. M. (2025b). The fundamental basis of the sense of us. Argumenta, 1–23.
  19. Pereira, R. H. S., & Barcellos, V. M. (2025c). The self in prereflexive self-consciousness self-concernment without self-reference. Journal of Philosophical Investigations, 19(1), 30–30.
  20. Pontes, A. N. (2025a). From the ontology of money to monetary theory: Remarks on inflation and interest rates. Logica Universalis, 19(1), 1–15.
  21. Pontes, A. N. (2025b). Sobre desigualdade econômica e pobreza: Uma relação de causalidade. In A. N. Pontes & A. Neiva (Orgs.), Ensaios de filosofia da economia (Vol. 1, pp. 87–117). NEL/UFSC.
  22. Pontes, A. N., & Neiva, A. (Orgs.). (2025). Ensaios de filosofia da economia (Vol. 1). NEL/UFSC.
  23. Rodrigues, C., & Soutif, L. (2025). Ideophonic sequences: Challenging the asymmetric syntactic structure hypothesis. Glossa, 10(1), 1–25.
  24. Ruffino, M. (2025a). Contingent a priori truths: Reply to my critics. Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, 57(170), 199–221.
  25. Ruffino, M. (2025b). O pensamento de Gottlob Frege. Editora Monergismo.
  26. Ruffino, M. (2025c). Précis of contingent a priori truths: Metaphysics, semantics, epistemology and pragmatics. Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía, 57(170), 119–129.
  27. Sampaio Benites Correia, M. (2025a). G. E. Moore e o bom: Revisitando o primeiro capítulo de Principia Ethica. Análogos, 26, 60–75.
  28. Sampaio Benites Correia, M. (2025b). Por que não creio: Ateísmo justificado. Dialética.

2024

  1. Barcellos, V. M., & Pereira, R. H. S. (2024). Heterodoxia sobre a COVID em três camadas [Tradução]. Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics, 24, 1–32.
  2. Batistela, I. M. (2024). Uniformity in the dynamics of fiction-making. Philosophia, 52(2), 289–303.
  3. Chaves, M. F. F., & Rodrigues, C. (2022). Linguistic marker of schizotypy: A study on nominal reference. Revista da ABRALIN, 21, 1–26.
  4. Costa, M. W. A. d. (2024). Nomes descritivos e pensamentos singulares. Aufklärung: Revista de Filosofia, 11(Especial), 55–66.
  5. Costa, M. W. A. d., & Melo, T. B. (2024). Uma introdução à metafísica. Intersaberes.
  6. Delgado, L. (2024). Names are not (always) predicates. Mind & Language, 39(3), 330–347.
  7. Ferrari, F. M. (2024a). Formal issues of trope-only theories of universals. Erkenntnis, 89(3), 919–946.
  8. Ferrari, F. M. (2024b). Some notes on the role of the identity of indiscernibles in metaphysics. Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 80(4), 1215–1242.
  9. Ferrari, F. M. (2024c). Special issue on scientific process ontology and metaphysics: A thematic introduction. Manuscrito, 47(1): e-2024.
  10. Ferrari, F. M. (2024d). The nominalist limit of Kim’s ontological physicalism. Metaphysica, 25(2), 311–338.
  11. Leme, R., Coniglio, M., Lopes, B., & Venturi, G. (2024). Ecumenical propositional tableau: Ecumenical propositional tableau. Studia Logica, 113(2), 539–566.
  12. Marsili, N. (2024a). Fictions that don’t tell the truth. Philosophical Studies, 181(5), 1025–1046.
  13. Marsili, N. (2024b). The definition of assertion: Commitment and truth. Mind & Language, 39(4), 540–560.
  14. Marsili, N. (2024c). Truth: The rule or the aim of assertion? Episteme, 21(1), 263–269.
  15. Medeiros, A. B., Rodrigues, C., & Silva, M. C. F. (2022). Investigações formais em línguas brasileiras: Estado da arte. Revista Linguística, 18, 6–20.
  16. Merlussi, P. (2024a). The consequence argument and the possibility of the laws of nature being violated. Philosophia, 52(2), 289–303.
  17. Merlussi, P. (2024b). What’s wrong with the counterfactual based objection to Cornea? Synthese, 204(3): 78.
  18. Merlussi, P., & de Oliveira Nunes, R. (2024). Metafísica analítica. Editora Quero Saber.
  19. Morokawa, R. L. (2024). Desmedida. In Y. Fabris & R. Corrêa (Orgs.), Inservíveis. Perspectivas críticas: Catálogo da exposição (Vol. 1, pp. 24–26). UFPR.
  20. Pereira, R. H. S. (2024a). Consciousness and cognition in Kant's First Critique. Journal of Philosophical Investigations, 18(2), 159–160.
  21. Pereira, R. H. S. (2024b). Kant’s nonconceptual view on imagination and its role in cognition. Con-Textos Kantianos, (19), 201–222.
  22. Pereira, R. H. S. (2024c). Kaplanianism. Synthese, 204(1): 12.
  23. Pereira, R. H. S. (2024d). Mary’s cognitive progress. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 3(2): 45.
  24. Pereira, R. H. S. (2024e). The elusiveness of the content of perception: Non-existential, nonsingular, and incomplete. Journal of Philosophical Investigations, 4(2), 23–46.
  25. Pereira, R. H. S. (2024f). The role of externalism in unsafe but rational reasoning. Kriterion, 65(157), 1–22.
  26. Perrin, D. (2024). Re-remembering. Synthese, 204(6): 198.
  27. Perrin, D., & Barkasi, M. (2024). Immersing oneself into one’s past: Subjective presence can be part of the experience of episodic remembering. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 5: 3.
  28. Perrin, D., Moulin, C. J., & Sant’Anna, A. (2024). Déjà vécu is not déjà vu: An ability view. Philosophical Psychology, 37(8), 2466–2496.
  29. Petrolo, M., & Venturi, G. (2024a). Introduction. In M. Petrolo & G. Venturi (Eds.), Paradoxes between truth and proof (pp. 1–8). Springer.
  30. Petrolo, M., & Venturi, G. (2024b). Paradoxes between truth and proof. Springer.
  31. Pontes, A. N., & Reis, J. B. (2024). O que são preferências e como lidar racionalmente com elas. In N. Rela & R. Picoli (Orgs.), Temas em filosofia do comportamento econômico (pp. 97–121). Editora Fi.
  32. Rodrigues, C. (2024). Construções multiverbais no dialeto do triângulo mineiro / Multiverb constructions in the dialect of Triângulo Mineiro, Minas Gerais. Revista Linguística, 20, 375–391.
  33. Schmidt, J. V., & Venturi, G. (2024). Axioms and postulates as speech acts. Erkenntnis, 89(8), 3183–3202.
  34. Silva, J. V. O. M. E., Chaves, M. F. F., & Rodrigues, C. (2024). Language in schizophrenia: Interpreting structural deficits. Revista Linguística, 20, 424–442.
  35. Soutif, L., & Pontes, A. N. (2024). The logic and philosophy of so called moral and semantic innocence. Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, 28(1), 65–70.
  36. Venturi, G. (2024). Fine’s postulationism, objectivity, and mathematical creation. Noesis, 38, 123–137.
  37. Venturi, G., & Viale, M. (2024). What model companionship can say about the continuum problem. Review of Symbolic Logic, 17(2), 546–585.
  38. Venturi, G., & Yago, P. (2024). Modelling afthairetic modality. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 53(4), 1027–1065.

2023

  1. Bianchetti, M., & Venturi, G. (2023). Formal ontology and mathematics: A case study on the identity of proofs. Topoi, 42(1), 307–321.
  2. Chaves, M. F., Rodrigues, C., Ribeiro, S., Mota, N. B., & Copelli, M. (2023). Grammatical impairment in schizophrenia: An exploratory study of the pronominal and sentential domains. PLoS One, 18: e0291446.
  3. Costa, M. W. A. d. (2023). Uma introdução à filosofia da linguagem (2. ed.). Intersaberes.
  4. Ferrari, F. M. (2023). Substance metaphysics is incompatible with the causal closure of the metaphysical realm. Ética e Filosofia Política, 1(1), 78–102.
  5. Ferrari, F. M., & Bickhard, M. H. (2023). On emergence, again. Metaphysica, 24(1), 1–25.
  6. Lampert, F., & Waldrop, J. W. (2023). A puzzle about moral responsibility. Philosophical Studies, 180(8), 2291–2307.
  7. Marsili, N. (2023a). Group assertions and group lies. Topoi, 42(2), 369–384.
  8. Marsili, N. (2023b). Towards a unified theory of illocutionary normativity. In L. Caponetto & P. Labinaz (Eds.), Sbisà on speech as action (pp. xx–xx). Springer.
  9. Merlussi, P., & Lampert, F. (2023). Naming and free will. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 99(4), 475–484.
  10. Michaelian, K., Sakuragi, S., Openshaw, J., & Perrin, D. (2023). Mental time travel. In L. Bietti & P. Martin (Eds.), The Palgrave encyclopedia of memory studies (pp. 1–15). Palgrave Macmillan.
  11. Morokawa, R. L., Cid, R. R. L., & Scaramal, E. S. (Orgs.). (2023). Estética e filosofia da arte: Coletânea de artigos e ensaios. NEPFIL Online.
  12. Pereira, R. H. S. (2023a). Decoupling accuracy from fitness. Argumenta, 9(17), 1–14.
  13. Pereira, R. H. S. (2023b). Unraveling the anthropological-existential significance of transcendental propositions. Kant e-Prints, 18(2), 50–63.
  14. Pereira, R. H. S., De Souza Filho, S. F., & Barcellos, V. M. (2023). Brain patterns shaping embodied activities of their bodily limbs in perception and cognition. Qeios: e1.
  15. Pereira, R. H. S., Souza Filho, S. F., & Barcellos, V. (2023). Por que somos o nosso cérebro: O enativismo posto em questão. Trans/Form/Ação, 46(1), 517–555.
  16. Perrin, D. (2023). Accommodating the continuum hypothesis with the déjà vu/déjà vécu distinction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 46: e372.
  17. Perrin, D., & McCarroll, C. J. (2023). Immunity to error through misidentification in observer memories: A moderate separatist account. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 106(2), 299–323.
  18. Pires, R., & Rodrigues, C. (Eds.). (2023). Trending topics in romance linguistics (1st ed., Vol. 1). Isogloss.
  19. Plebani, M., Mauro, L. S., & Venturi, G. (2023). Thin objects are not transparent. Theoria, 89(3), 314–325.
  20. Pontes, A. N., Oliveira, M. K. (Org.), & Peres, R. A. (Org.). (2023). Textos selecionados de filosofia da economia II. Editora UFPel; NEPFIL Online.
  21. Rodrigues, C. (2023). Possessor raising and structural variations within the vP domain. Glossa: A Journal of General Linguistics, 8(1), 1–29.
  22. Rodrigues, C., & Pires de Oliveira, R. (2023). Breakthrough contributions of Romance languages to formal linguistics. Isogloss: Open Journal of Romance Linguistics, 9, 1–23.
  23. Rodrigues, C., & Saab, A. (Eds.). (2023). Formal approaches to languages of South America (1st ed.). Springer.
  24. Schirmer dos Santos, C., Sant'Anna, A., Michaelian, K., Openshaw, J., & Perrin, D. (2023). Debates contemporâneos em filosofia da memória: Uma breve introdução. Lampião, 4(1), 139–184.
  25. Tarafder, S., & Venturi, G. (2023). Independence proofs in non classical set theories. Review of Symbolic Logic, 16(4), 979–1010.
  26. Teixeira, C. (2023). Abducting the a priori. Synthese, 201(2): 59.
  27. Venturi, G., San Mauro, L., & Caponetto, L. (2023). How to make (mathematical) assertions with directives. Synthese, 202(5): 150.
  28. Venturi, G., & Viale, M. (2023). Second order arithmetic as the model companion of set theory. Archive for Mathematical Logic, 62(1), 29–53.

2022

  1. Bezerra, E., & Venturi, G. (2022). Many valued logics and bivalent modalities. Logic and Logical Philosophy, 31(4), 611–636.
  2. Chaves, M. F. F., & Rodrigues, C. (2022). Linguistic marker of schizotypy: A study on nominal reference. Revista da ABRALIN, 21, 1–26.
  3. Delgado, L. (2022). Names vs nouns. Philosophical Studies, 179(11), 3233–3258.
  4. Ferrari, F. M. (2022). An argument against nominalism. Synthese, 200(5): 403.
  5. Gilbert, D., Kubyshkina, E., Petrolo, M., & Venturi, G. (2022). Logics of ignorance and being wrong. Logic Journal of the IGPL, 30(5), 870–885.
  6. Jockwich, S., Tarafder, S., & Venturi, G. (2022). Ideal objects for set theory. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 51(3), 583–602.
  7. Lampert, F. (2022a). A puzzle about the fixity of the past. Analysis, 82(3), 426–434.
  8. Lampert, F. (2022b). The logic of sequence frames. Review of Symbolic Logic, 15(1), 101–132.
  9. Markosian, N. (2022a). Five new arguments for the dynamic theory of time. Philosophical Perspectives, 36(1), 158–181.
  10. Markosian, N. (2022b). Meaning in life and the nature of time. In I. Landau (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of meaning in life (pp. xx–xx). Oxford University Press.
  11. Marsili, N., & Löhr, G. (2022). Saying, commitment, and the lying–misleading distinction. Journal of Philosophy, 119(12), 687–698.
  12. Medeiros, A. B., Rodrigues, C., & Silva, M. C. F. (2022). Investigações formais em línguas brasileiras: Estado da arte. Revista Linguística, 18, 6–20.
  13. Merlussi, P. (2022). Revisiting McKay and Johnson's counterexample to (B). Philosophical Explorations, 25(2), 189–203.
  14. Morokawa, R. L. (2022). O problema do especialista e as propriedades representadas na percepção. In E. Calado & R. L. Cid (Orgs.), Filósofas analíticas contemporâneas (Série Dissertatio Filosofia, 1ª ed., Vol. 1, pp. 80–96). NEPFil Online; Editora da UFPel.
  15. Muhr, R., Duarte, E. L., Rodrigues, C., & Thomas, J. (Eds.). (2022). Pluricentric languages in the Americas (1st ed., Vol. 2). PCL.
  16. Pereira, R. H. S. (2022a). Causal role of phenomenal consciousness. Principia (Florianópolis. Online), 26, 299–312.
  17. Pereira, R. H. S. (2022b). Constructivism in Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Humanities & Social Sciences Communications, 9: 264.
  18. Pereira, R. H. S. (2022c). Neo-Pyrrhonism: A new reading of Pyrrhonian acceptance in the light of the contemporary philosophy of mind. Sképsis, 13(24), 46–52.
  19. Pereira, R. H. S. (2022d). Rejecting the plea for modesty: Kant's truth-directed transcendental argument based on self-consciousness of our own existence. Istoriya-Elektronnyi Nauchno-Obrazovatelnyi Zhurnal, 3, 1–20.
  20. Pereira, R. H. S. (2022e). The causal role of consciousness in a physical world. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 99(3), 379–404.
  21. Pereira, R. H. S., & Souza Filho, S. F. (2022). Book review: Papineau, D. The metaphysics of sensory experience, (Oxford: Oxford University, 2021, 176 pages). Manuscrito, 45(2), 267–276.
  22. Perrin, D. (2022). La causalité du souvenir épisodique. Un debate récent en philosophie de la mémoire. Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, 113(1), 85–108.
  23. Perrin, D., & Sant’Anna, A. (2022). Episodic memory and the feeling of pastness: From intentionalism to metacognition. Synthese, 200(2), 1–26.
  24. Pontes, A. N., Oliveira, M. K. (Org.), & Peres, R. A. (Org.). (2022). Textos selecionados de filosofia da economia (1ª ed.). Editora UFPel; NEPFIL Online.
  25. Ruffino, M. (2022). Contingent a priori truths: Metaphysics, semantics, epistemology and pragmatics. Springer Nature.
  26. Soutif, L. (2022). Meaning, colouring, and logic: Kaplan vs. Frege on pejoratives. Princípios: Revista de Filosofia, 29(59), 151–171.
  27. Soutif, L., & Márquez Sosa, C. M. (2022). Travis like cases and adequate ideas: A critical notice of Bozickovic’s the indexical point of view. Manuscrito, 45(3), 23–52.
  28. Soutif, L., & Pontes, A. (2022). True pejorative sentences beyond the existential core: On some unwelcome implications of Hom and May’s theory. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy, 63(153), 757–780.
  29. Teixeira, C. (2022). Epistemic analyticity reconsidered. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 103(2), 280–292.

2021

  1. Bezerra, E., & Venturi, G. (2021). A Non Standard Kripke Semantics for the Minimal Deontic Logic. Logic and Logical Philosophy, 30(1), 97–107.
  2. C., M. (2021). Neo Fregean Enactivism Without Re Ctifications. Philosophy International Journal, 4(2).
  3. Crone, K. (2021). Foundations of a We Perspective. Synthese, 198(12), 11815–11832.
  4. Ferrari, F. M. (2021). Process-based entities are relational structures. From Whitehead to structuralism. Manuscrito, 44, 149-207.
  5. Lampert, F., & Merlussi, P. (2021). How (Not) to Construct Worlds With Responsibility. Synthese, 199(3-4), 10389–10413.
  6. Lampert, F., & Waldrop, J. W. (2021). Grim Variations. Faith and Philosophy, 38(3), 287–301.
  7. Markosian, N. (2021). The Growing Block, the Epistemic Objection and Zombie Parrots. Disputatio, 13(63), 399–410.
  8. Marsili, N. (2021). Retweeting: Its Linguistic and Epistemic Value. Synthese, 198, 10457–10483.
  9. Marsili, N., & Wiegmann, A. (2021). Should I Say That? An Experimental Investigation of the Norm of Assertion. Cognition: 212(C), 104657.
  10. Morokawa, R. L. (2021). Obras de arte são essencialmente institucionais? Philosóphos, 25, 417-445.
  11. Pereira, R. H. S. (2021). Das irreduzible Selbstbewusstsein alltäglicher Erfahrung. Protosociology, 37, 1–16.
  12. Pereira, R. H. S. (2021). Fichte's original insight reviewed. Fichte-Studien (Amsterdam), 49, 394–415.
  13. Pereira, R. H. S. (2021). Phenomenalism and Kant. Con-Textos Kantianos. International Journal of Philosophy, 13, 245–258.
  14. Pereira, R. H. S. (2021). Por que é impossível se ser cético nos dias atuais: Uma breve refutação do Neopirronismo. Discurso - Departamento de Filosofia da FFLCH da USP, 50, 86–109.
  15. Pereira, R. H. S. (2021). The naturalizing program of perceptions defended. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 1, 1–19.
  16. Pereira, R. H. S. (2021). Um modelo alternativo para a cognição direta de estados mentais elementares de terceiros. Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea, 9, Article 88.
  17. Perrin, D. (2021). Embodied Episodic Memory: A New Case for Causalism? Intellectica, 74, 229–252.
  18. Perrin, D. (2021). On the Logical Form and Ontology of Inferences in Conversational Implicatures. Semiotica, 2021(240), 285–315.
  19. Ruffino, M. (2021). Descriptive Reference Fixing and Epistemic Privileges. Aufklärung: 8.
  20. Ruffino, M. (2021). Tractatus 2.0211 and Stalnaker’s Assertions. Disputatio, 10(18), 77-91
  21. Soutif, L. (2021). Qu'est-ce qu'une Pensée Singulière? Vrin.
  22. Soutif, L., & Márquez Sosa, C. M. (2021). On Ur Intentionality. Revista De Filosofia Moderna E Contemporânea, 9(2), 79–99.
  23. Souza, S. F., Barcellos, V., & Pereira, R. H. S. (2021). Consciência e evolução: Uma análise do naturalismo biológico a partir do debate adaptacionista. Revista Reflexões, 18(10), 183-200.
  24. Tarafder, S., & Venturi, G. (2021). Zf Between Classicality and Non Classicality. Studia Logica, 110(1), 189–218.
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